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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

My name is Ronald A. Pearlman. I am a Professor of Law at the Georgetown University
Law Center, where I teach courses in Federal income taxation.

It is a great privilege to appear before the Subcommittee today. I appear on my own
behalf. My comments represent my personal views and not necessarily those of
Georgetown University or any other organization with whom I am associated.

I have appeared before the Subcommittee on two prior occasions to address issues
relating to corporate tax reform. In 1983, as a representative of the Treasury Department,
I discussed problems with the carryover of corporate net operating losses and other tax
attributes, and in 1985, I discussed factors relating to the then-current wave of corporate
mergers. Today, I would like to comment on two tax reform topics that, at least on the
surface, appear to be quite different than the subjects of my prior testimony.

Business Tax Preferences

The first topic that I wish to address involves the recurring question whether Congress
should provide tax relief to corporate taxpayers, by which I mean to include all business
taxpayers regardless of their form of organization, through targeted tax preferences or by
means of periodic reductions in the corporate tax rate.

My instinct, informed by 27 years of experience as a practicing tax lawyer advising
clients in many different industries, and ranging in size from small closely-held
businesses to large multinational corporations, and by 10 years of assorted tax- related
government service, is that corporate tax rate reduction most often is preferable to the
enactment of industry-specific or activity-specific tax preferences. Put another way, I
think the legislative default policy should be to eliminate tax preferences and lower
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corporate tax rates.

In May 1985, President Reagan transmitted to the Congress the recommendations that
served as the impetus for enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The summary of
President Reagan's proposals stated, "The tax system should, insofar as possible, foster
economic growth by . . . allowing resources to be allocated efficiently on the basis of
economic rather than tax considerations." In furtherance of this efficiency objective, the
Report went onto say, "Special subsidies or preferences for specific industries or sectors
should be curtailed except where there is a clear national security interest that argues to
the contrary."

Why was efficiency so important to President Reagan? I think it was because he
understood that by altering incentives, an industry-specific or an activity-specific tax
preference will cause business taxpayers to disregard market forces -- or at least alter the
influence of market competition on their decisions -- thereby adversely affecting the
allocation of resources of the particular business and of the Nation.

Not only is a distortion in the business decision making process likely to impose costs on
the economy, it also tilts the playing field in favor of one group of businesses over
another. The financial advantage of a narrow tax preference may influence how third
parties -- lenders and equity investors, for example -- evaluate competing businesses. The
tax preference thereby may create an inappropriate advantage in the marketplace that
discourages entrepreneurs in emerging industries or technologies who do not enjoy a
comparable tax advantage from successfully competing for capital, thereby stifling U.S.
economic growth.

While I admit to a bias in favor of President Reagan's approach to tax reform because of
my involvement in the development of the Administration's proposals and my advocacy
for their enactment before the Ways and Means Committee, I think our tax system would
be much improved if the tax law today more fully reflected his philosophy. However, one
does not have to accept a market efficiency analysis to question the appropriateness of
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narrow business tax preferences.

We might tolerate the economic distortion resulting from a particular preference if we
could be reasonably certain that it produces a sufficient quantity of the desired behavior
over and above the behavior that would occur absent the existence of the preference. To
the extent a tax preference provides a tax subsidy for behavior that would occur anyway,
the subsidy is a waste of money that could be expended more productively on new or
existing programs, to reduce the deficit, or to provide broad-based tax relief.

Unfortunately, our collective knowledge of the effectiveness of targeted tax preferences
is not well developed. Recently, the Director of Strategic Issues for the Government
Accountability Office was reported to have bemoaned the lack of research on the true
effect of tax incentives. Supporters of a tax preference typically point to an assortment of
ad hoc examples of the positive impact of the preference and to self-serving supportive
assertions by executives about the incentive effect. In the absence of a body of unbiased
research regarding the effectiveness of tax preferences or a negative analysis by
opponents of a particular preference, Members of Congress, under the pressure of the tax
legislative process, understandably tend to accept supportive information as a validation
of the preference's effectiveness.

The U.S. business tax system is replete with targeted tax preferences. Some are narrowly
targeted, some more broadly. However, in every case, one class of business taxpayers is
preferred over another. In the aggregate, the revenue effects of these preferences are
substantial. Take for example a small group of tax credits: the credit for increasing
research activities, popularly known as the research and development or "R&D" tax
credit (Section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code); the low-income housing credit (S. 42);
the renewable electricity production credit (S. 45); and the nonconventional source fuel
credit, more commonly referred to as the Section 29 credit even though the section
reference is out of date (S. 45K). Assuming extension of the R&D credit, the combined
projected revenue effect of these four credits for a single year (F/Y 2007) is
approximately $13.7 billion, and the five-year effect is approximately $81.6 billion.
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Why would it not be appropriate to compare the potential economic effects of retaining
the credits or alternatively financing a reduction in the corporate tax rate with the
revenues generated by repeal of the credits? I am not so naive to assume that there is any
realistic chance repeal will occur. Nevertheless, supporters of existing, as well as
proposed, business tax preferences should be forced to justify why the alternative of a
corporate rate reduction is not in the best interests of U.S. tax and economic policy. This
Subcommittee is an ideal venue for carefully considering the continuing utility of these
and other tax preferences. To those who say that $13.7 billion is not sufficient revenue to
effect a meaningful reduction in the corporate tax rate, I am confident that in response to
the Subcommittee's request, the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation will provide a
list of additional repeal candidates that would finance meaningful corporate tax rate
reduction.

There are two occasions in the tax legislative process when advocates of existing tax
preferences may realistically be pressured to justify continuation of their preferences.
One arises when Congress needs to increase tax revenues to reduce the deficit or offset
other tax reductions. The other is when Congress undertakes a comprehensive review of
present law in connection with broad-based tax reform. In anticipation of any corporate
tax reform project in the Ways and Means Committee, I encourage the Subcommittee to
seek the assistance of the Joint Committee on Taxation, the Congressional Budget Office,
the Congressional Research Service, and General Accountability Office, as well as
academic and private sector analysts, in carefully and, might I suggest boldly,
reevaluating the appropriateness of existing business tax preferences. This exercise will
not, and probably should not, result in the repeal of all of them. However, with Member
support, it should serve to identify those provisions that no longer can be justified and
assist in improving the effectiveness of those provisions that remain in the law.

Deductibility of Business Interest

The second topic that I wish to discuss relates to the deductibility of interest expense on
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debt incurred by business taxpayers to finance the purchase of capital investment,
including not only real and tangible property (plant, machinery and equipment), but also
intangible property, such as patents, copyrights, and know-how.

One important reason to consider the relevance of the deductibility of interest expense in
the context of corporate tax reform relates to the problems under present law that result
from characterization of corporate investment as debt or equity. However, I am motivated
to discuss business interest expense today for a different reason, namely, because of the
relationship between the deductibility of interest expense and the tax law cost recovery
rules relating to debt-financed investments that I assume will be an important part of any
corporate tax reform debate.

"Cost recovery" refers to mechanisms by which a business taxpayer is entitled to reduce
or offset otherwise taxable income by its investment in a business asset. Depreciation is
an important form of cost recovery, as is the right of a taxpayer to offset its undepreciated
investment, referred to as the asset's adjusted tax basis, against the consideration the
taxpayer receives on the sale or other disposition of a business asset in calculating the
gain or loss on the disposition. Other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that might
not appear to be cost recovery mechanisms are best analyzed as if they were. In
particular, certain business tax credits, such as the R&D credit and the low-income
housing tax credit, are calculated as a percentage of a taxpayer's relevant expenditures
and, therefore, afford the taxpayer an added means of recovering a portion of its
investment in property associated with the tax-preferred activity.

A pure, or idealized, income tax subjects a business taxpayer to tax on its (net) economic
income. In theory, a properly designed depreciation system under a pure income tax,
known as "economic depreciation," would enable a business taxpayer to recover its cost
in a business asset by properly matching periodic depreciation deductions with income
generated by the asset during the same period. Depreciation deductions would be
calculated based on the economic useful life of the asset (that is, the period over which
the asset is expected to be productive) and the actual decline in value of the asset in each
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period.To properly calculate the taxpayer's economic income, it also is appropriate under
a pure income tax to allow the taxpayer to deduct interest expense related to debt incurred
to finance the purchase of the asset, because the interest expense is an added cost of
earning the income generated by the asset.

Under a pure consumption tax that is calculated by reference to sales or other income of a
business (a cash-flow consumption tax; a subtraction-method value-added tax, such as the
so-called Flat Tax or the Bradford X Tax; or an invoice-credit form of value- added tax),
the cost of capital investments would be fully recovered at the time incurred either
through a deduction equal to 100 percent of the asset's cost or, in the case of an invoicecredit value added tax, by means of a credit for prior taxes paid.

Unlike a pure income tax, a consumption tax exempts income from capital from tax. This
exemption is implemented at the business level of a consumption tax by allowing
business taxpayers to fully deduct the cost of a capital investment when incurred, a cost
recovery mechanism known as "expensing." The effect of expensing is to exempt the
income generated by the business asset from tax on a present value basis, assuming a
constant rate of return and constant tax rates. This is so even if it appears that income
generated by the asset is taxable because the taxpayer makes nominal tax payments to the
government over the productive life of the asset. This analysis is know as the "immediate
deduction-yield exemption equivalence" and is based on work postulated in 1942 by an
economist named E. Cary Brown."

Because income from business assets is deemed to be exempt from tax under a
consumption tax by reason of the expensing of capital investment, it is inappropriate to
also permit the business taxpayer to deduct interest expense on debt incurred to finance
the purchase or development of the expensed asset. To do so would create a negative tax
that would provide an improper government subsidy to the taxpayer. Consistent with this
analysis, the Growth and Investment Tax Plan recently proposed by the President's Tax
Reform Advisory Panel would allow immediate expensing of all new business
investment, but also would eliminate the deductibility of business interest. The Panel's
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Report describes the proposal to deny the deduction of business interest as "an essential
component" of the Plan. "Allowing both expensing of new investments and an interest
deduction would result in a net tax subsidy to new investment. Projects that would not be
economical in a no-tax world might become viable just because of the tax subsidy. This
would result in economic distortions and adversely impact economic activity."

Present law is not a pure income tax but, rather, a hybrid tax system that has both income
tax and consumption tax characteristics. I will be surprised if a fundamental reform of
present law will result in a new tax law that one could describe as "pure." It is for this
reason that I chose to raise the interest expense issue in my comments today.

We have seen a trend in U.S. tax policy toward liberalized cost recovery. Depreciation
under present law is accelerated, that is, it is faster than economic depreciation, and in
some instances, the statute provides for immediate expensing of capital investment, a
prominent example being the so-called small business expensing (S. 179). Consumption
tax proponents understandably identify expensing as a key element of any reform of the
current tax system, and I would expect expensing or some form of accelerated
depreciation would be considered as part of a reform of the business tax system.

I am concerned that in the legislative sausage factory, expensing will be perceived as an
attractive component of a business tax package but the disallowance of interest expense
will not, leading to the possible enactment of the tax subsidy to which the President's
Panel referred. This subsidy will encourage a variety of tax shelters and other taxmotivated activities that will pose a very significant threat to the tax base.

If we could be certain that the interest income paid by business taxpayers would be
subject to tax in the hands of the recipients, the revenue effect of the continued
deductibility of interest expense would be of less concern, even though the distortive
effects to which the President's Panel refers would continue to be troubling. However, we
know that a sizeable portion of interest income is exempt from U.S. tax because corporate
debt is owned by so-called tax-indifferent parties, including foreign lenders that are not
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subject to U.S. tax. In 1989, the Joint Committee on Taxation reported that, based on
1987 data, foreign investors owned 13.3 percent of U.S. corporate bonds and an
additional 62.2 percent were owned by insurance companies and pension funds, resulting
in the current exemption from tax of a sizeable portion of the interest income received on
corporate debt in their portfolios. I presume the percentages reported in 1989 are larger
today.

The relationship between expensing and the deductibility of business interest expense, in
my view, is a very significant issue. If I am correct, it will be important for the
Subcommittee to analyze specific cost recovery proposals with this issue in mind.

As a final point, it is worth noting that the subsidy to which the President's Tax Reform
Panel referred exists under present law, because interest expense frequently is incurred in
connection with debt-financed business investments that are eligible for accelerated
depreciation or expensing under Section 179. Thus, the tax treatment of business interest
expense under present law also is an appropriate topic for examination.

Conclusion

At the beginning of my remarks, I mentioned that I had previously appeared before the
Subcommittee to comment on two corporate tax reform topics, the transferability of
corporate tax attributes and corporate mergers and acquisitions. References to those two
previous appearances might seem merely evidence of my nostalgia, having no relevance
to my comments today. I do value my interactions with the Subcommittee over the years,
but I also I think the prior appearances to which I referred are relevant.

To the extent the tax law creates distortions, as do industry- specific or activity-specific
tax preferences, and to the extent the tax law creates discontinuities, as does the
deductibility of interest by a business taxpayer who is entitled to recover the cost of a
capital investment faster that economic depreciation, there exist increased incentives to
structure transactions to enable business taxpayers that do not have sufficient income to
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fully use the tax preferences or interest deductions to directly or indirectly transfer those
preferences to another taxpayer who can use them to reduce its tax liability or to merge
with another business taxpayer that is able to use the tax benefit. As the Subcommittee
considers corporate tax reform proposals, I encourage you to keep in mind the possible
implications of these distortions and discontinuities.

Thank you very much. I will be pleased to attempt to answer any questions.
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